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Abstract
In common treatments of deontic logic, the obligatory is what’s true in
all deontically ideal possible worlds. In this article, I o󰎎er a new seman-
tics for Standard Deontic Logic with Leibnizian intensions rather than
possible worlds. Even though the new semantics furnishes models that re-
semble Venn diagrams, the semantics captures the strong soundness and
completeness of Standard Deontic Logic. Since, unlike possible worlds,
many Leibnizian intensions are not maximally consistent entities, we can
amend the semantics to invalidate the inference rule which ensures that
all tautologies are obligatory. I sketch this amended semantics to show
how it invalidates the rule in a new way.
1 Introduction
Possible worlds now enjoy a comfortable monopoly on our modal theorizing.
Yet this monopoly was by no means inevitable. We can easily imagine sce-
narios in which Kripke and others chose di󰎎erent vocations, and, as a result,
possible worlds fell into less able hands after idling on the shelf for much
longer. But I don’t simply mean that possible worlds might have been less in-
fluential than they currently are. I mean something more controversial—that
something other than possible worlds might have enjoyed a sizable portion of
their current influence.
More specifically, I believe that certain resources buried in Leibniz’s writ-
ings might have provided enough formal flexibility and explanatory power to
compete with possible worlds. I won’t defend that belief here, since doing so
would require, in roughly equal measure, the vast amounts of time and talent
devoted to possible worlds. I do hope to mark a tally on its behalf, however.
In Warmke (2015), I use these Leibnizian resources in a new semantics for
modal logic under a metaphysical interpretation. But I’ve not yet shown that
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they can model other kinds of modal discourse. Here, I show that the Leib-
nizian resources plausibly capture the modal logic of obligation.
The Leibnizian resources consist of primitively intensional entities with a
mereological structure. They are primitively intensional in the sense that (i)
they are not further defined over possibilia as sets or functions, and (ii) the
mereological structure of a property does not reduce to subset or subclass rela-
tions among classes of possibilia. In this paper, I use them in a new semantics
for Standard Deontic Logic whose models resemble Venn diagrams. The se-
mantics says that 󳇛©φ󳇠 (“it is obligatory that φ”) is true when the property of
being such that φ is part of being a deontically ideal world.
In Section 2, I briefly cover Standard Deontic Logic and its standard se-
mantics. Then, after I explain my semantic theory’s Leibnizian pedigree in
Section 3, I present the semantics in Sections 4 through 7. In Appendix I,
I show that its account of logical consequence is extensionally equivalent to
the account of logical consequence in the standard semantics. Finally, in Ap-
pendix II, I sketch a variation of the semantics to invalidate the inference rule
that ensures all tautologies are obligatory.
2 The Standard Picture
Before we cover the new semantics, it will be helpful to revisit Standard Deontic
Logic, its language, and the standard semantics. We’ll begin with the language.
2.1 Language
The language of Standard Deontic Logic (hereafter, “SDL”) adds the proposi-
tional operator © to the language of classical propositional logic, whose basic
logical symbols include negation (¬) and the material conditional (⊃) as well
as an infinite stock of basic sentence letters (p1, p2, ... ). Taking ¬, ⊃, and © as
the basic symbols, we may define the well-formed formulas of SDL recursively
in the usual way. Then, we may introduce the non-basic symbols of disjunction
(∨), conjunction (∧), and the biconditional (≡) and define them in terms of
our basic symbols in the usual ways. The language of SDL also contains a
permission operator P definable in terms of ¬ and © (i.e., Pφ =de f . ¬©¬φ).
To simplify our discussion, I will adopt the obligation reading of © (“It
is obligatory that...”) rather than the ought-to-be reading (“It ought to be
that...”). These readings are not equivalent, as Schroeder (2011) and others
have shown. Though some prefer the ought-to-be reading for Standard Deontic
Logic, nothing consequential hangs on the choice here. Any who prefer the
ought-to-be reading may follow Lewis and stipulate that “what is obligatory
(conditionally or unconditionally) is what ought to be the case, whether or
not anyone in particular is obligated to see to it” (1973, 100).
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2.2 Logic
I adopt the axiomatization of Standard Deontic Logic in McNamara (2006,
207), with a few cosmetic changes:
TAUT. All tautologous w󰎎s of the language
©-K. ©(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (©φ ⊃ ©ψ)
©-D. ©φ ⊃ Pφ
MP. If ⊢ φ and ⊢ φ ⊃ ψ, then ⊢ ψ
©-NEC. If ⊢ φ, then ⊢ ©φ
Both TAUT and MP come from classical propositional logic. TAUT grandfa-
thers in as axioms all the tautologies of classical propositional logic. SDL also
inherits the main inference rule of classical propositional logic in the form of
MP.
The remaining principles govern the ©-operator. ©-K says that if a con-
ditional is obligatory, then if the conditional’s antecedent is obligatory, so is
its consequent. ©-D says that whatever is obligatory is also permissible. Fi-
nally, ©-NEC says that if φ is a theorem of SDL it is also a theorem that φ is
obligatory.
2.3 Semantics
According to the standard semantics, 󳇛©φ󳇠 is true in a possible world w just
in case φ is true in every world w′ such that Rww′, where Rww′ holds be-
tween worlds w and w′ when w′ is w-acceptable, or acceptable from w’s stand-
point. Canonical presentations characterize w-acceptability according to the
standard metasemantics: the w-acceptable worlds are “deontically perfect” or
“ideal” worlds “in which all propositions are true which ought to be true in [w]”
(Føllesdal and Hilpinen 1970, 17). (Compare Hintikka (1970, 71), Casteñeda
(1972, 676).) More recently, Paul McNamara says that a world w′ is acceptable
to a world w when “[w′] is a world where everything obligatory in [w] holds
(i.e., no violations of the obligations holding in [w] occur in [w′])” (2006, 211).
Diving a little deeper, a model M is an ordered triple 〈W, R, I〉, where
W is a set of possible worlds and R is the acceptability relation defined over
W. In every model, R is serial, or such that for all worlds w in W, some w′
in W is such that Rww′. In e󰎎ect, the seriality condition prohibits any model
from having a world which accesses no worlds at all. Finally, the interpretation
function I assigns truth values to atomic propositions in each world. Then, a
valuation function VM for a model M = 〈W, R, I〉 uses R and I to assign truth
values to every proposition in each world w ∈ W:
(i) For any atomic sentence φ, VM(φ, w) = 1 i󰎎 I(φ, w) = 1.
(ii) VM(¬φ, w) = 1 i󰎎 VM(φ, w) = 0.
(iii) VM(φ ⊃ ψ, w) = 1 i󰎎 either VM(φ, w) = 0 or VM(ψ, w) = 1.
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(iv) VM(©φ, w) = 1 i󰎎 for all w′ ∈ W such that Rww′, VM(φ, w′) = 1.
A w󰎎 φ is logical consequence of the w󰎎s in Γ (“Γ ⊨ φ”) when, for any world w ∈
W in any model M, if every w󰎎 ψ in Γ is such that VM(ψ, w) = 1, then VM(φ,
w) = 1. φ is valid when VM(φ, w) = 1 for every w ∈ W in every model M.
SDL is both sound and complete with respect to the standard semantics.
In Appendix I, I use these results to show that SDL is sound and complete
with respect to my semantics, too. However, these proofs are not trivial. The
new semantics does not primarily revolve around possible worlds but around
primitively intensional entities with a mereological structure. We cover that
structrure next.
3 Leibnizian Intensions
Like Frege and others after him, Leibniz thought meaning had at least two
components. (See Lenzen (2004) for discussion and further references.) We
can distinguish the two components most clearly in the case of predicates.
A predicate’s Leibnizian extension is the set or class of all possible things that
satisfy the predicate. The Leibnizian extension of ‘is a dog’ is not the set
or class of actual dogs but the set or class of all possible dogs. As sets or
classes of possibilia, Leibnizian extensions violate the principle of extension-
ality and therefore qualify as intensional entities by contemporary standards.
So Leibnizian extensions di󰎎er from extensions now standardly conceived—
as sets or classes whose members are actual objects that satisfy a predicate.
A predicate’s Leibnizian intension is an associated divine concept. The Leib-
nizian intension of ‘is a dog’, for instance, is the divine concept of being a
dog. Importantly, Leibnizian intensions are primitively intensional and do not
reduce to Leibnizian extensions or any kind of class or function defined over
possibilia.
Leibnizian intensions and extensions provide two ways to treat necessarily
true propositions like all dogs are animals. On the extensional side, the proposi-
tion is true when the class of possible animals contains, i.e., has as a subclass,
the class of possible dogs. This treatment should seem familiar to those with
backgrounds in contemporary logic. But since Leibniz’s intensional treatment
may seem foreign to those steeped in contemporary logic, some stage-setting
may help familiarize us with it.
Although Leibnizian intensions do not have members or subclasses, many
have “parts”—the concepts that a concept contains. Second, Leibniz seems to
endorse the schema that, necessarily, all Fs are Gs if and only if being G is part
of being F. The schema is not a reductive definition for intensional parthood.
And, in Warmke (2019), I reject the left-to-right direction. But it does help
illustrate the kinds of parthood judgments Leibniz would ordinarily accept.
And it remains a useful pedagogical tool since many of its instances are true.
For example, all possible squares are possible rectangles (but not vice versa),
and all possible dogs are possible animals (but not vice versa). So the schema
implies that being rectangular is part of being square (but not vice versa) and that
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being an animal is part of being a dog (but not vice versa). On the intensional
side, then, the necessary proposition that all dogs are animals is true when
being an animal is part of being a dog.
Leibniz (1690/1996, 486) noticed that the intensional and extensional treat-
ments run inversely to one another. The extensional treatment says that nec-
essary propositions of the form all Fs are Gs are true when the extension of ‘G’
contains (in the sense of having as a subclass) the extension of ‘F’. And the
intensional treatment says that the proposition is true when the intension of ‘F’
contains (in the sense of having as a conceptual part) the intension of ‘G’. The
diagram below illustrates this inversion in the case of the above dog-animal
proposition:
Figure 1: The Leibnizian intensional and extensional inversion.
Leibnizian intensions and extensions behave this way, in part, because an
intension’s proper parts correspond to the entrance conditions for the inten-
sion’s own possible extension. So, for example, if being F’s proper parts are,
at bottom, being G1, being G2, and being G3, then the possible Fs comprise the
intersection, not the union, of all the possible G1s, the G2s, and the G3s. On
this picture, then, an intension typically has more restrictive entrance condi-
tions for its possible extension than the possible extensions of its proper parts.
Generally speaking, the more restrictive the entrance conditions, the fewer
things there are that meet them. Since, on Leibniz’s picture, being an animal
is a proper part of being a dog, the entrance conditions of the former’s exten-
sion are less restrictive than the entrance conditions of the latter’s extension.
As a result, the class of possible animals subsumes and outstrips the class of
possible dogs.
These considerations inspire a new semantics for modal logic, in general,
and a new semantics for Standard Deontic Logic, in particular. A contem-
porary Leibnizian could de-theologize the intensional entities involved by re-
placing divine concepts with properties. Then she could say, first, that the
Leibnizian extension of ‘is a world’ is the class of possible worlds and, second,
that its Leibnizian intension is, intuitively, the property whose parts are the
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properties that any possible world would exemplify if it were actual. Impor-
tantly, this is not a definition of the property, but an intuitive characterization
of it. We’ll call it the property of being a world in general (hereafter, W). Of
course, properties don’t have parts like a table might have spatio-temporal
parts. Following Leibniz’s view in Parkinson (1966, 135) that an intension’s
parts are its conjuncts, we may also conceive of W as a conjunctive proposi-
tional property (the property of being such that this, and such that this, and
so on). So, in what follows, one may substitute ‘is a conjunct of’ for ‘is part
of’ and ‘has as a conjunct’ for ‘includes (as a part)’.
In the background metaphysics, the propositional property being such that
φ (hereafter, [φ]) is part of W just in case any possible world w would be
such that φ if w were actual. Again, this is not a definition of W but a simple
biconditional bridge from the more to the less familiar. Against the intensional
backdrop I develop in Warmke (2015; 2019), “possible worlds” are themselves
intensional entities and the commonalities among them owe to their having
W as a part rather than the other way around. So instead of using possible
worlds to define the modal notions, we can use W, the property anything must
exemplify to be a world in the first place. According to the modal semantics,
then, 󳇛□φ󳇠 is true just in case [φ] is part of W (Warmke 2015). We will return
to this idea shortly.
Our contemporary Leibnizian could then go on to say that the Leibnizian
extension of ‘is a deontically ideal world’ is the class of deontically ideal pos-
sible worlds and that its Leibnizian intension is the property whose parts are
the properties that any deontically ideal possible world would exemplify, if it
were actual. We’ll call this Leibnizian intension the property of being deontically
ideal (hereafter, O). Now, the standard metasemantics for the possible worlds
approach says that a world w′ is deontically ideal relative to w when everything
that’s obligatory in w is true in w′. So the standard metasemantics uses a list
of obligations in the metalanguage to define the notion of a deontically ideal
world. Feldman (1986, 182) and Forrester (1996, 132-134) have argued that
this move is viciously circular. But, as I argue in Warmke (ms.), the move isn’t
circular. And the Leibnizian can do something similar. With such a list, we
can define the property of being a deontically ideal world by ensuring that O’s
parts correspond to obligations on the list. Then, instead of saying that 󳇛©φ󳇠
is true in w when 󳇛φ󳇠 is true in all deontically ideal worlds relative to w, we can
say that 󳇛©φ󳇠 is true when [φ] is part of O. As those familiar with SDL should
expect, we won’t need to relativize O, the property of being deontically ideal,
to di󰎎erent lists of obligations in the metalanguage in order to validate all and
only the theorems of SDL.
Ordinarily, we restrict the quantifiers to narrow the possible worlds un-
der consideration from all possible worlds to the subclass of deontically ideal
possible worlds. With Leibnizian intensions, we do the inverse. We “add”
properties to the property of being a world in general to form the property
of being a deontically ideal world. As a result, the relationship between ideal
worlds and all possible worlds, on the one hand, and the relationship between
being a world in general and being a deontically ideal world, on the other, form
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the familiar Leibnizian pattern:
Figure 2: The property addition and quantifier restriction inversion.
This pattern suggests that the sort of flexibility obtained by possible worlds
approaches with the tool of quantifier restriction might also be obtained by a
Leibnizian approach with the tool of property addition. We cannot assess the
suggestion in a single paper. But the semantics I provide here does provide
some evidence for it.
In Warmke (2015), 󳇛□φ󳇠 is true when [φ] is part of W, the property of
being a world in general. The model structure in the semantics consists of
the ordered triple 〈A, W, P〉. Where ‘Alpha’ names the actual world, A is the
property of being Alpha. W is the property of being a world in general, and P
is a relation of property parthood. In the semantics, A’s parts correspond to
true (non-modal) propositions and W’s parts correspond to necessarily true
propositions. But now we can reinterpret the pure formalism of that semantics
and apply it to SDL.
We can rig the semantics for SDL with two small changes. First, we reinter-
pret the property that plays the W-role so that its parts correspond to what is
obligatory rather than what is necessary. Second, we configure P to invalidate
formulas which are not theorems of SDL. For example, we will invalidate the
deontic analogue of the (T) axiom schema (i.e., ©φ ⊃ φ) to avoid saying that
everything which is obligatory is the case. In the resulting model structure
〈A, O, P〉, A remains the property of being Alpha. Our new friend, O, is the
property of being a deontically ideal world. I’ll call it “the property of being
an ideal world,” for short. On the intended interpretation, O has “swallowed
up” W by taking over its job and its parts.
We may partially represent the model structure in a Venn-like diagram.
A model structure that plausibly represents our actual state of a󰎎airs would
capture the fulfillment of some obligations and the failure of many more. The
Venn-like diagram below depicts such a situation:
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Figure 3: A partially represented model structure.
The diagram has areas for the obligatory and true, the obligatory and false,
and the non-obligatory. A propositional property [φ] is:
(a) in the overlapping space when 󳇛φ󳇠 and 󳇛©φ󳇠 are both true,
b) in the non-overlapping grey space when 󳇛©φ󳇠 is true but 󳇛φ󳇠 is not, and
(c) in the non-overlapping white space when 󳇛φ󳇠 is true but 󳇛©φ󳇠 is not.
Any model with at least one propositional property in the non-overlapping
grey space falsifies the deontic analogue of the (T) axiom schema (i.e., ©φ ⊃
φ) because at least one φ is such that 󳇛φ󳇠 is false even though 󳇛©φ󳇠 is true.
In summary, the new semantics for SDL has three main components. A,
the property of being Alpha, accounts for non-modal truths. O, the property of
being deontically ideal, accounts for what’s obligatory. And P, the parthood
relation, helps validate all and only the theorems of SDL. Let’s examine each
of these components more closely.
4 On Being Alpha
A is a propositional property whose conjuncts or parts capture the actual
world’s character. It is true that Fred is tall i󰎎 being such that Fred is tall is part
of A. The proposition that Fred is tall is non-modal since it embeds no modal
operators. Since A’s parts capture how the world actually is, we may use them
to capture a non-modal proposition’s truth:
(A) 󳇛φ󳇠 is true when [φ] is part of A.1
We will have to assume as a matter of course that A has various features
for it to play its role in a semantics for SDL. Properties appropriate for the
A-role I will call A-suitable, and we have two routes to them. We may start with
maximal consistent sets and define A-suitable properties as those whose parts
correspond to the members of such a set. Or we may say that a property is A-
suitable when it satisfies principles analogous to those which define maximally
1 This idea bears important similarities to the treatment of the actual world in Zalta (1993,
410-421).
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consistent sets. Though nothing important hangs on which route we choose,
we choose the first, more convenient, route.
A proposition φ and the propositional property [φ] each correspond to the
other. And a set S and property Q derivatively correspond when each of S’s
members corresponds to one of Q’s parts and vice versa. We will soon de-
fine A-suitable properties as corresponding to maximal consistent sets. And
this requires more precise notions of maximality and consistency. A set Γ of
propositions is maximalpc when it is such that for every non-modal φ, either
φ ∈ Γ or ¬φ ∈ Γ. And a set Γ of propositions is consistentpc when no finite
subset {φ1, ... , φn} of Γ is such that that ¬(φ1 ∧ ... ∧ φn) is provable in the
propositional calculus. A set is maximal-consistentpc when it is both maximalpc
and consistentpc.
A property Q is A-suitable when some maximal-consistentpc set S is such
that φ ∈ S i󰎎 [φ] is part of Q. Given any maximal-consistentpc set S, and given
the correspondence between propositions and their propositional properties,
there is a set of propositional properties S′ such that φ ∈ S i󰎎 [φ] ∈ S′. The
property mereology in Warmke (2015, 320-323) and (2019, 9-11) includes an
unrestricted composition principle according to which, for any specifiable set
of properties, there is a sum, a property, composed of those properties. Given
such a principle, there is a sum, a property, composed of those properties in
S′. Thus, for each maximal-consistentpc set S, there is an A-suitable property
Q such that φ ∈ S i󰎎 [φ] is part of Q. There are no other A-suitable properties.
We’ll call this Principle 1.
A-suitable properties unsurprisingly satisfy principles analogous to those
which define maximally consistent sets. EveryA-suitable property ismaximalpc,
or such that for any non-modal φ, either [φ] or [¬φ] is part of it. And every
such property is consistentpc, or such that there is no finite set of its parts {[φ1],
... , [φn]} such that ¬(φ1 ∧ ... ∧ φn) is provable in the propositional calculus.
So every A-suitable property is maximal-consistentpc, i.e., both maximalpc and
consistentpc. Since the theorems of the propositional calculus hold in every
maximal-consistentpc set, the propositional properties corresponding to those
theorems are parts of every A-suitable property. Therefore, given (A), in any
model based on any model structure 〈A, O, P〉, every theorem of the propo-
sitional calculus is true. So Principle 1 helps validate TAUT. However, it does
not validate TAUT by itself. The validity of some tautologies in SDL, say ©p
⊃ ©p, depends on O’s features, too.
Principle 1 also ensures that A-suitable properties satisfy an intuitive con-
ception of the material conditional. Since φ ⊃ ψ is a member of a maximal-
consistentpc set S i󰎎 either ¬φ or ψ is a member of S, [φ ⊃ ψ] is part of an
A-suitable property Q i󰎎 either [¬φ] or [ψ] is part of Q. And so the parts of any
A-suitable property behave in accordance with a property analogue of modus
ponens. For suppose that [φ] and [φ ⊃ ψ] are both part of an A-suitable prop-
erty Q. Since [φ ⊃ ψ] is part of Q, either [¬φ] or [ψ] is part of Q. Because [φ]
is part of Q and Q is consistentpc, [¬φ] is not part of Q . Therefore, [ψ] is part
of Q. So for any non-modal φ and ψ, if [φ] and [φ ⊃ ψ] are both part of Q, so
is [ψ].
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The A-suitable properties in models that represent the actual world bear
important connections to the worlds in the standard semantics for SDL. Given
the usual treatment of possible worlds in the standard semantics for SDL as
maximal and consistent sets, each maximal-consistentpc set is a subset of a
possible world in some model. And each possible world in any model has a
maximal-consistentpc set as a subset. So Principle 1 secures a tight connection
between the A-suitable properties defined in terms of maximal-consistentpc
sets and the possible worlds in the standard semantics.
(1-a) For any model of the new semantics based on any model struc-
ture 〈A, O, P〉, there is a maximal-consistentpc subset S of a
world w in some possible worlds model such that φ ∈ S i󰎎 [φ]
is part of A.
(1-b) For the maximal-consistentpc subset S of any world w in any
possible worlds model, there is a model in the new semantics
based on some model structure 〈A, O, P〉 such that φ ∈ S i󰎎
[φ] is part of A.
A-suitable properties certainly resemble possible worlds. And if we call them
that, as many possible worlds appear across the collection of all models in
the new semantics as appear in any single model of possible worlds semantics.
But the point of this essay isn’t that we can forego worlds entirely. Rather,
the point is that as long as they have a certain mereological structure, each
individual model for SDL needs at most one, the one assigned to characterize
the actual world. We don’t need them to account for modal truths.
5 On Being an Ideal World
O is a propositional property whose conjuncts or parts determine the truth
values of ©-statements:
(O) 󳇛©φ󳇠 is true when [φ] is part of O.
Given (O) and the permission operator P’s abbreviation of ¬©¬φ, we also
have truth conditions for P-statements:
(P) 󳇛Pφ󳇠 is true when [¬φ] is not part of O.
We will incorporate these truth conditions into the valuation function in the
next section. It is important to note that we will attribute to O the features
necessary to help capture SDL. I myself do not think O should have all these
features, and this is all to the good. The very features I’d like to deny of O
correspond to theorems of SDL which would not be theorems in my preferred
deontic logic on my preferred reading of the modal operators. Just as the stan-
dard semantics for SDL gave rise to further variations, the new semantics here
can give rise to further variations. However, unlike the standard semantics, the
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feature in my semantics that provides the truth conditions for ©-statements
does not involve maximally consistent entities. So the semantics gives way to
a flexible array of possible variations with surprising results. In Appendix II,
I sketch a variation which invalidates ©-NEC.
To get the full bu󰎎et of O-suitable properties, we once again go the easy
route of sets. A set S of propositions is closed under modus ponens when it is
such that if φ ∈ S and (φ ⊃ ψ) ∈ S, then ψ ∈ S. And a set S of propositions
is closed under necessitation when it is such that ©φ ∈ S if φ ∈ S. The set Λ is
closed under monus ponens and necessitation and contains
(PC) All the tautologies of the propositional calculus,
as well as every instance of the schemas
(K) ©(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (©φ ⊃ ©ψ), and
(D) ©φ ⊃ Pφ.
So, by definition, Λ contains all and only the theorems of SDL. An extension
of Λ is the union of Λ and any (possibly non-empty) set of propositions, again
closed under modus ponens, and for which none of its finite subsets {φ1, ... ,
φn} is such that that ¬(φ1 ∧ ... ∧ φn) is provable in SDL. We’ll call this last
feature consistencysdl .
A property Q is O-suitable when an extension ofΛ, S, is such that φ ∈ S i󰎎 [φ]
is part of Q. Given any extension of Λ, and given the correspondence between
propositions and their propositional properties, there is a set of propositional
properties S′ such that φ ∈ Λ i󰎎 [φ] ∈ S′. Given the background property
mereology in Warmke (2015, 320-323) and (2019, 9-11), which includes the
aforementioned unrestricted composition principle, there is a sum, a property,
composed of those properties in S′. Thus, for each extension S of Λ there is
an O-suitable property such that φ ∈ S i󰎎 [φ] is part of Q. There are no other
O-suitable properties.
Given our definition of O-suitability, every O-suitable property includes a
propositional property corresponding to each logical truth of the propositional
calculus. And since every extension of Λ is closed under modus ponens, the
parts of each O-suitable property collectively obey an analogue of modus po-
nens. For suppose that [φ] and [φ ⊃ ψ] are both part of an O-suitable property
Q. Then φ and φ ⊃ ψ are members of Q’s corresponding extension of Λ, S.
Since S is closed under modus ponens, ψ is also a member of S. Therefore,
since Q corresponds to S, [ψ] is part of Q. So if [φ] and [φ ⊃ ψ] are parts of
some O-suitable property Q, [ψ] is part of Q, too.
Already, we can see why the (K) axiom is valid. Suppose for reductio that󳇛©(φ ⊃ ψ)󳇠 is true but 󳇛(©φ ⊃ ©ψ)󳇠 is false. Then, by (O), [φ ⊃ ψ] and [φ] are
parts of O but [ψ] is not. Since the modus ponens analogue guarantees that
[ψ] is part of O, we have reached the desired contradiction and shown that the
(K) axiom is true in every model.
Since every extension of Λ is consistentsdl , every O-suitable property Q is
consistentsdl , or such that no finite set of its parts {[φ1], ... , [φn]} is such that
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that ¬(φ1 ∧ ... ∧ φn) is provable in SDL. This consistency guarantees that for
any φ, at most one of [φ] or [¬φ] is part of O. As I explain in the next section,
this feature of P validates ©-D, the characteristic axiom of SDL.
Given our account of O-suitability, O-suitable properties also include the
instances of
(O-K) [©(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (©φ ⊃ ©ψ], and
(O-D) [©φ ⊃ Pφ].
Notice, however, that O’s inclusion of (O-K) and (O-D) are not the features
of O that validate the axioms ©-K and ©-D, respectively. Rather, the modus
ponens analogue for O validates ©-K, and O’s consistency validates ©-D. Why,
then, should O also include (O-K) and (O-D)?
O includes the propositional properties corresponding to logical truths,
and, in the current context, the logical truths encompass the theorems of SDL.
So our definition of O-suitability ensures that O-suitable properties contain
propositional properties corresponding to the theorems of SDL. Since each
O-suitable property has a part corresponding to each member of Λ, and since
Λ itself is closed under necessitation, we will find a similar feature among the
parts of O-suitable properties. Every O-suitable property contains (i) proposi-
tional properties corresponding to the logical truths of the propositional cal-
culus, (ii) propositional properties corresponding to instances of (O-K) and
(O-D), and (iii) the properties which follow from these via the modus ponens
and necessitation analogues. So if [φ] is any of these properties, then, [©φ]
is also part of each O-suitable property. We’ll call this the necessitation feature,
since it helps ensure that the inference rule ©-NEC preserves validity. The
necessitation feature ensures that, for each theorem φ of SDL, [φ] is part of O
in every model, which ensures that 󳇛©φ󳇠 is true in every model, given (O).
A set is maximalsdl when it contains, for every φ in the language of SDL,
either φ or ¬φ. Some extensions of Λ are maximalsdl . Therefore, some O-
suitable properties are maximalsdl , or such that for every w󰎎 φ of SDL, either
[φ] or [¬φ] is part of O. But O-suitability does not require maximality. Given
(O), models in which O is maximalsdl guarantee that, for every φ, either 󳇛©φ󳇠
or 󳇛©¬φ󳇠 is true. In these models, nothing is permissible unless it is obligatory.
Since this principle is invalid in SDL, we do not restrict the parthood relation
to exclude non-maximalsdl properties from serving as O in a model.
6 On Parthood
The model structure’s third component is P, the parthood relation. We can
restrict P in a number of ways. To express those restrictions in the meta-
language, I will use ‘<’ for the is part of relation. Some possible restrictions
are more complicated than others. For example, consider the propositional
property of being such that [φ] is part of O. In the metalanguage, I will use
‘[[φ] < O]’ to refer to the propositional property of being such that [φ] is part
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of O. This propositional property has another propositional property, [φ], em-
bedded within it. But this embedding is not parthood, in my sense. Finally,
let ∕< abbreviate ‘is not part of’, and let ‘[[φ] ∕< O]’ refer to the propositional
property of being such that [φ] is not part of O. Some possible restrictions on
P include:
O-consistency. If [φ] < O, then [¬φ] ∕< O.
Connectedness. If [φ] < O, then [φ] < A.
Forti󰎓cation. If [φ] < A, then [[¬φ] ∕< O] < O.
Ininclusivity. If [φ] < O, then [[φ] < O] < O.
Inexclusivity. If [φ] ∕< O, then [[φ] ∕< O] < O.
To make the semantics adequate for SDL, we flip P’s “on” switch for O-
consistency and leave undisturbed the switches for Connectedness, Fortifica-
tion, Ininclusivity, and Inexclusivity. When P is O-consistent but otherwise
unrestricted, we validate all and only the theorems of SDL.
We have already seen how the semantics validates ©-K. But let’s see how it
validates ©-D, on the one hand, and how it invalidates a clear non-theorem of
SDL, on the other. First, consider ©-D: ©φ ⊃ Pφ. Let’s suppose that 󳇛©φ󳇠 is
true. Then, [φ] is part of O, via (O). O-consistency then ensures that [¬φ] is not
part of O. Consequently, 󳇛Pφ󳇠 is true, via (P). So ©-D is true in all O-consistent
models.
Second, consider the (T) axiom schema from alethic modal logic, i.e., □φ
⊃ φ. It says that whatever is necessary is the case. While it is an intuitive
principle in alethic modal logic, its deontic analogue, ©-T (©φ ⊃ φ), is not.
Since ©-T isn’t a theorem of SDL, the new semantics should capture its falsity
in at least one model. ©-T is false when some propositional property [φ] is part
of O but not part of A. Since we’ve not restricted P to satisfy Connectedness,
there are many models in which some parts of O are not parts of A. Why think
this?
For an atomic proposition φ and its negation ¬φ, there are pairs of exten-
sions of Λ (Section 5) for which φ but not ¬φ is a member of one and ¬φ but
not φ is a member of the other. From this, it follows from the definition of O-
suitable properties that the parts of at least one O-suitable property include [φ]
but not [¬φ] and that the parts of at least one other O-suitable property include
[¬φ] but not [φ]. Since φ is atomic, we may use Lindenbaum’s Lemma and the
previously mentioned pairs of extensions of Λ to infer that there are pairs of
maximal-consistentpc sets for which φ but not ¬φ is a member of one and ¬φ
but not φ is a member of the other. From this, it follows from the definition of
A-suitable properties that the parts of at least one A-suitable property include
[φ] but not [¬φ] and that the parts of at least one other A-suitable property
include [¬φ] but not [φ].
Our models for SDL are O-consistent and impose no further constraint on
how A and O relate to one another in a model. Therefore, A-suitable and
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O-suitable properties may freely combine with one another in models for SDL.
That is, each O-suitable property pairs with each A-suitable property in some
O-consistent model. We will call this the free combination feature. Given this
feature, each of the above O-suitable properties whose parts include [φ] but
not [¬φ] cohabit in a model with one of the above A-suitable properties whose
parts include [¬φ] but not [φ]. (We can also infer that the above O-suitable
properties whose parts include [¬φ] but not [φ] each cohabit in a model with
one of the above A-suitable properties whose parts include [φ] but not [¬φ].)
As a result, there are models in which some parts of O are not parts of A.
Now, there are also models in which every part of O is also part of A. This,
too, follows from the definitions of O-suitable and A-suitable properties and
the free combination feature. These are models in which©-T is true. But these
models cannot make ©-T valid because the previously mentioned models (in
which some parts of O are not parts of A) su󰎏ce to invalidate ©-T. Like the
standard semantics, then, the semantics here has models in which ©-T is true
and others in which it is false and serve to invalidate ©-T.
The remaining restrictions correspond to deontic analogues of axioms
from other well-known modal systems. Fortification would secure the deontic
analogue of the (B) axiom of modal logic. And Ininclusivity and Inexclusivity
would secure deontic analogues of the (S4) and (S5) axioms of modal logic,
respectively. These are not theorems of SDL. So the semantics here does not
restrict P in these ways.
7 The Semantics, Formally
In the new semantics, a model structure is the triple 〈A, O, P〉, where A is the
property of being Alpha, O is the property of being an ideal world, and P
specifies restrictions on the parts of A and O. We restrict ourselves to models
in which P satisfies O-consistency.
A model M is an ordered quadruple 〈A, O, P, V〉, which adds a valuation
function V to the model structure 〈A, O,P〉 on which it is based. The valuation
function V for a model M (“VM”) meets the following conditions:
(i*) For any atomic proposition φ, VM(φ) = 1 i󰎎 [φ] < A.
(ii*) VM(¬φ) = 1 i󰎎 VM(φ) = 0.2
(iii*) VM(φ ⊃ ψ) = 1 i󰎎 either VM(φ) = 0 or VM(ψ) = 1.
(iv*) VM(©φ) = 1 i󰎎 [φ] < O.
Since, in Appendix I, we will refer to the standard models and the accounts of
logical consequence, validity, and so on, that they generate, we will subscript
the newer accounts of these notions with an ‘n’ to avoid confusion. Restricting
ourselves to O-consistent models, a w󰎎 φ is a logical consequencen of the w󰎎s in
2 It is also true that VM(¬φ) = 1 i󰎎 [¬φ] < A. Hence, [φ] ≮ A i󰎎 [¬φ] < A. Similar remarks
apply to clauses (iii) and (iv).
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Γ (“Γ ⊨n φ”) when VMn(φ) = 1 if every w󰎎 ψ in Γ is such that VMn(ψ) = 1, for
every model Mn. A w󰎎 φ is validn when VMn(φ) = 1 for every model Mn.
In Appendix I, I show that my semantic theory’s account of logical con-
sequence is extensionally equivalent to the account of logical consequence in
the traditional semantics.
8 Conclusion
Some may wonder whether a new semantics for a benchmark system like SDL
is worth anything more than a notch on a small scorecard for Leibnizian inten-
sions. But I can’t imagine getting a bigger bang for my buck. The traditional
semantics served as a springboard for further semantic theories. Without it,
we wouldn’t now have the vast array of semantic theories that arose from
amending or expanding it or from amending or expanding the amendments
and expansions. Given this history, we might reasonably regard an alterna-
tive as a substantial down payment for future innovation. In Appendix II, I
provide some evidence for this optimistic outlook by amending the semantic
theory to invalidate ©-NEC in a new way. Overall, I hope to have made it
slightly less reasonable to dismiss Leibnizian intensions simply because they
have not yet been as successful as possible worlds. This disparity rests almost
entirely on the vast resources thrown at one rather than the other. And this
latter disparity is, in my view, an accident of history.
Appendix I
To avoid ambiguity, we will need to subscript the labels for various notions
of the standard semantics in Section 2.3. I’ll use the subscript ‘t’ for models
in the traditional semantics and for the related notions of consequence and
validity.
Where “Γ ⊢ φ” says that φ is provable in SDL from the w󰎎s in Γ and “Γ
⊨t φ” says that φ is a consequencet of the w󰎎s in Γ, the principles below are
already well-established:
S󰝜󰝢󰝛󰝑󰝛󰝒󰝠󰝠-T. If Γ ⊢ φ, then Γ ⊨t φ.
C󰝜󰝚󰝝󰝙󰝒󰝡󰝒󰝛󰝒󰝠󰝠-T. If Γ ⊨t φ, then Γ ⊢ φ.
Where “Γ ⊨n φ” says that φ is a consequencen (in the new sense) of the w󰎎s in
Γ, we will prove:
S󰝜󰝢󰝛󰝑󰝛󰝒󰝠󰝠-N. If Γ ⊢ φ, then Γ ⊨n φ.
C󰝜󰝚󰝝󰝙󰝒󰝡󰝒󰝛󰝒󰝠󰝠-N. If Γ ⊨n φ, then Γ ⊢ φ.
We can prove both if we first prove the following:
E󰝞󰝢󰝖󰝣󰝎󰝙󰝒󰝛󰝐󰝒-1. If Γ ⊨t φ, then Γ ⊨n φ.
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E󰝞󰝢󰝖󰝣󰝎󰝙󰝒󰝛󰝐󰝒-2. If Γ ⊨n φ, then Γ ⊨t φ.
For E󰝞󰝢󰝖󰝣󰝎󰝙󰝒󰝛󰝐󰝒-1 and S󰝜󰝢󰝛󰝑󰝛󰝒󰝠󰝠-T imply S󰝜󰝢󰝛󰝑󰝛󰝒󰝠󰝠-N, and E󰝞󰝢󰝖󰝣󰝎󰝙󰝒󰝛󰝐󰝒-
2 and C󰝜󰝚󰝝󰝙󰝒󰝡󰝒󰝛󰝒󰝠󰝠-T imply C󰝜󰝚󰝝󰝙󰝒󰝡󰝒󰝛󰝒󰝠󰝠-N. Proving E󰝞󰝢󰝖󰝣󰝎󰝙󰝒󰝛󰝐󰝒-1 and
-2 only requires proving the two principles below:
M󰝜󰝑󰝒󰝙󰝠-TN. For any world w in any model Mt , some newer model Mn
is such that VMt (φ, w) = 1 i󰎎 VMn(φ) = 1.
M󰝜󰝑󰝒󰝙󰝠-NT. For each newer model Mn, some world w in some model
Mt is such that VMt (φ, w) = 1 i󰎎 VMn(φ) = 1.
But to prove M󰝜󰝑󰝒󰝙󰝠-TN and M󰝜󰝑󰝒󰝙󰝠-NT, we will first prove two claims about
O-suitable properties:
(2-a) For each model Mn, there is a world w in some model Mt
such that for any φ, φ ∈ w′ for every w′ such that Rww′ i󰎎 [φ]
is part of O.
(2-b) For any world w in any model Mt , there is a model Mn such
that for any φ, φ ∈ w′ for every w′ such that Rww′ i󰎎 [φ] is
part of O.
With respect to the traditional semantics, let a world w’s ideal set Sw contain φ
i󰎎 φ ∈ w′ for every w′ such that Rww′. And with respect to the new semantics,
a property is O-suitable i󰎎 it serves as O in some model. Therefore, proving
2-a and 2-b only requires proving that (i) for any O-suitable property Q, there’s
a world w in some traditional model such that φ ∈ Sw i󰎎 [φ] is part of Q, and
(ii) for any world w in any traditional model, there’s an O-suitable property Q
such that φ ∈ Sw i󰎎 [φ] is part of Q.
To prove (i), and by extension (2-a), assume for reductio that some O-
suitable property Q is such that there is no world w in any traditional model
for which φ ∈ Sw i󰎎 [φ] is part of O. By definition (Section 5), Q is such that
there is some extension S of Λ for which φ ∈ S i󰎎 [φ] is part of Q. Now let A be
the set of SDL w󰎎s, and let B be the relative complement of S with respect to A
(i.e., the set of w󰎎s in A which are not in S). Then let set C be the set of all w󰎎s
φ such that, first, φ ∈ B and, second, the union of S and φ is consistentsdl . Set
C, then, is the set of SDL w󰎎s which aren’t in S and are individually consistent
with S. We will then order C’s members into a list, D:
D = φ1, φ2, ...
With D, we construct a sequence of sets consisting of the union of S and each
w󰎎 in D:
D
′
= S ∪ φ1, S ∪ φ2, ...
Each set in this sequence is a consistent set of SDL w󰎎s. So, by Lindenbaum’s
Lemma, each set in the sequence is a subset of some maximal consistent set
of SDL w󰎎s.
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For each xn ∈ D′, a non-empty set dn of maximal-consistentsdl sets is such
that (i) for all w ∈ dn, xn ⊆ w, and (ii) every w ∈ dn is such that ©φ ∈ w i󰎎 φ
∈ w. There is a set D′′ of these sets dn of maximal-consistentsdl sets. By the
Axiom of Choice, there is a set W containing a member from each member
dn of D
′′
. And, furthermore, ∩W = S.
Intuitively, we’ve just defined a set a worlds such that each world is ac-
ceptable to itself alone and whose intersection is the extension S of Λ with
which we began. Now we can simply build a traditional model involving these
worlds and one more, a world w
′
for which all and only the worlds in W are w
′
-
acceptable, and we will have ensured that the ideal set of w
′
and the O-suitable
property Q are such that φ ∈ Sw′ i󰎎 [φ] < Q.
Let w
′
be a maximal consistent set of SDL w󰎎s such that ©φ ∈ w′ i󰎎 φ is
a member of every member of W. Then let W
′
= W ∪ {w′}. And let R be a
set of ordered pairs defined over W
′
such that (a) 〈w′, w′〉 󲧿 R, (b) for every
wn ∈ W′ such that wn ∕= w′, 〈w′, wn〉 ∈ R, and (c) for every wn ∈ W′ such that
wn ∕= w′, 〈wn, wn〉 ∈ R. (a) and (b) ensure that every world is acceptable to w′
except w
′
itself, and (c) ensures that every world besides w
′
is acceptable to
itself. Together, this means that R is serial but not reflexive. And we ensure
that for every φ, ©φ ∈ w′ i󰎎 φ ∈ S, our extension of Λ. Hence, the extension
S of Λ is identical to the ideal set Sw′ . Therefore, there is a world w in some
traditional model such that φ ∈ Sw i󰎎 [φ] is part of Q. Contradiction. So we
have proved 2-a.
To prove (ii), and by extension (2-b), assume for reductio that for a world
w in a traditional model, there is no O-suitable property Q such that φ ∈ Sw
i󰎎 [φ] is part of Q. Sw is an intersection of w-acceptable worlds. Every world
in the traditional model contains Λ as subset. So every w-acceptable world
contains Λ as subset. Furthermore, if every w-acceptable world contains a
formula φ not in Λ, then since each such world is consistent and closed under
modus ponens, each such world will contain any formulas derivable from the
w󰎎s in Λ together with φ. As a result, the intersection of w-acceptable worlds
is the union of Λ and some possible non-empty set of w󰎎s closed under modus
ponens. Hence, Sw is an extension of Λ. Therefore, by the definition of O-
suitability, some O-suitable property Q is such that [φ] is part of Q i󰎎 φ is in
Sw. Contradiction. So we’ve established (ii) and 2-b.
With (1-a), (1-b), (2-a), and (2-b) in hand, we can prove Models-TN and
Models-NT. And with these latter two, we can prove Equivalence-1 and -2.
The Proof
To proveModels-TN, assume for reductio that some world w in some model
Mt is such that there is no newer modelMn for which VMt (A, w) = 1 i󰎎VMn(A)
= 1. To reach a contradiction, we will prove by induction that Mt and some
newer model Mn are such that for any w󰎎 A, VMt (A, w) = 1 i󰎎 VMn(A) = 1.
When a world w in model Mt and A in a newer model Mn are such that for
every atomic w󰎎 φ, φ ∈ w i󰎎 [φ] < A, w in Mt and Mn are atomic equivalent.
Our proof will rely on atomic equivalence, and we will begin with the case of
atomic w󰎎s.
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Suppose A is an atomic w󰎎 φ. Then, 1-b guarantees that there is some atomic
equivalent model Mn such that φ ∈ w in Mt i󰎎 [φ] is part of A in Mn. By (i)
and (i*), the valuation clauses for atomic w󰎎s from the traditional (Sec. 2)
and new (Sec. 7) theories, respectively, VMt (φ, w) = 1 i󰎎 VMn(φ) = 1.
For the inductive hypothesis, assume that for every formula B less complex
than formula A below, the world w in model Mt is such that for some atomic
equivalent model Mn, VMt (A, w) = 1 i󰎎 VMn(A) = 1.
Suppose that A is ¬φ. By (ii) and (ii*), VMt (¬φ, w) = 1 i󰎎 VMt (φ, w) = 0, and
VMn(¬φ) = 1 i󰎎 VMn(φ) = 0, respectively. By the inductive hypothesis, VMt (φ,
w) = 0 i󰎎 VMn(φ) = 0. Therefore, VMt (¬φ, w) = 1 i󰎎 VMn(¬φ) = 1.
Suppose that A is φ ⊃ ψ. By (iii) and (iii*), VMt (φ ⊃ ψ, w) = 1 i󰎎 either
VMt (φ, w) = 0 or VMt (ψ, w) = 1, and VMn(φ ⊃ ψ) = 1 i󰎎 either VMn(φ) = 0
or VMn(ψ) = 1, respectively. By the inductive hypothesis, VMt (φ, w) = 0 or
VMt (ψ, w) = 1 i󰎎 VMn(φ) = 0 or VMn(ψ) = 1. Therefore, VMt (φ ⊃ ψ, w) = 1 i󰎎
VMn(φ ⊃ ψ) = 1.
Suppose that A is ©φ. (iv) says that VMt (©φ, w) = 1 i󰎎 for all w′ ∈ W such
that Rww′, VMt (φ, w′) = 1. And for all w′ ∈W such that Rww′, VMt (φ, w′) = 1
i󰎎 for every w′ such that Rww′, φ ∈ w′. 2-b says that a world w is such that for
every w′ for which Rww′, φ ∈ w′ i󰎎 [φ] < O in some newer model Mn. By the
free combination feature (Section 6), any A-suitable property satisfying the
clauses above cohabits in some new model Mn with the O-suitable property
here. By (iv*), then, some atomic equivalent model Mn is such that VMt (©φ,
w) = 1 i󰎎 VMn(©φ) = 1.
Therefore, model Mt and some newer model Mn are such that for any w󰎎
A, VMt (A, w) = 1 i󰎎 VMn(A) = 1. Contradiction. This completes the reductio
and establishes Models-TN.
To prove Models-NT, assume for reductio that some newer model Mn is
such that there is no world w in any model Mt for which VMt (φ, w) = 1 i󰎎
VMn(φ) = 1. To reach a contradiction, we will prove by induction that Mn
and some w in some model Mt are such that for any w󰎎 A, VMt (A, w) = 1 i󰎎
VMn(A) = 1. We begin again with the base case of atomic w󰎎s.
Suppose A is an atomic w󰎎 φ. Then, 1-a guarantees that there is some atomic
equivalent model Mt such that φ ∈ w in Mt i󰎎 [φ] is part of A in Mn. By (i)
and (i*), VMt (φ, w) = 1 i󰎎 VMn(φ) = 1.
For the inductive hypothesis, assume that for every formula B less complex
than formula A below, model Mn is such that there is some world w in an
atomic equivalent model Mt for which VMt (A, w) = 1 i󰎎 VMn(A) = 1.
Suppose that A is ¬φ. By (ii) and (ii*), VMt (¬φ, w) = 1 i󰎎 VMt (φ, w) = 0, and
VMn(¬φ) = 1 i󰎎 VMn(φ) = 0, respectively. By the inductive hypothesis, VMt (φ,
w) = 0 i󰎎 VMn(φ) = 0. Therefore, VMt (¬φ, w) = 1 i󰎎 VMn(¬φ) = 1.
Suppose that A is φ ⊃ ψ. By (iii) and (iii*), VMt (φ ⊃ ψ, w) = 1 i󰎎 either
VMt (φ, w) = 0 or VMt (ψ, w) = 1, and VMn(φ ⊃ ψ) = 1 i󰎎 either VMn(φ) = 0
or VMn(ψ) = 1, respectively. By the inductive hypothesis, VMt (φ, w) = 0 or
VMt (ψ, w) = 1 i󰎎 VMn(φ) = 0 or VMn(ψ) = 1. Therefore, VMt (φ ⊃ ψ, w) = 1 i󰎎
VMn(φ ⊃ ψ) = 1.
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Suppose that A is ©φ. By (iv*), VMn(©φ) = 1 i󰎎 [φ] < O. 2-a says that [φ]
is part of O in Mn i󰎎 there is a world w in some model Mt such that φ ∈ w′
for every w′ such that Rww′. Now, the atomic equivalence of w in a model Mt
with A in Mn does not determine anything about w’s ideal set Sw (because R
is only required to be serial). Therefore, by (iv), some world w in some atomic
equivalent model Mt is such that VMt (©φ, w) = 1 i󰎎 VMn(©φ) = 1.
So the model Mn and some model Mt are such that for any w󰎎 A, VMt (A,
w) = 1 i󰎎 VMn(A) = 1. Contradiction. This completes the reductio and es-
tablishes Models-NT. Since we’ve established both Models-TN and Models-
NT, we’ve proved both Equivalence-1 and Equivalence-2 and therefore also
Soundness-N and Completeness-N.
Appendix II
Some have have expressed concerns about ©-NEC because it ensures that all
tautologies are obligatory (von Wright (1963, 154), al-Hibri (1978, 15), Jones
and Pörn (1985), McNamara (2006, 227)). Channeling G. H. von Wright
(1981, 8), Charles Pigden (1989, 139) writes: “The kindest thing to be said
about this is that it is an ‘absurdity’ which logicians have been induced to
‘swallow’ for the sake of ‘formal elegance and simplicity’.” That 1 is or isn’t
an even number is true, and necessarily so. And some have reinterpreted the
©-operator plausibly so that 󳇛©φ󳇠 is true when φ is an arbitrary tautology (An-
derson (1956) and Wedewood (2006; 2007)). But the concerns above presup-
pose plausible senses of ‘ought’ and ‘obligation’ on which not all tautologies
ought to be or are obligatory. On any of these senses, a single non-obligatory
tautology complicates matters greatly for possible worlds approaches. Since
each tautology is true in all possible worlds, each tautology is true in any sub-
set of them, including the subset of ideal possible worlds. But being true in all
ideal possible worlds su󰎏ces for being obligatory in the standard semantics.
The semantic theories in which ©-NEC fails use possible worlds, and they
avoid ©-NEC either by rendering all obligations as conditional obligations or
by adding non-normal worlds in which nothing is obligatory and everything
is permissible (al-Hibri (1978), Chellas (1980), Jones and Pörn (1985), and
Goble (1990)). But it seems worthwhile to have a semantic theory that can
avoid ©-NEC without making all obligations conditional or by appealing to
worlds which, for all we know, are actually impossible.
Neighborhood semantics is perhaps the most impressive alternative frame-
work that invalidates ©-NEC. But why should worlds in which everything is
permissible and nothing is obligatory enter into the truth conditions about
what is actually obligatory or what actually ought to be the case?3 Further-
more, neighborhood semantics has strange consequences for those who would
like to invalidate ©-NEC. As Eric Pacuit (2017, 54) shows, the following holds
for the class of neighborhood frames:
3 Questions like this motivate work under the ‘truthmaker semantics’ label. One could
argue that the my theories should fall under the same label. See Fine (2014; 2017).
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©-RE. if φ ≡ ψ is valid, then ©φ ≡ ©ψ is valid.
Since φ ≡ (φ ∧ ⊤) is also valid, it follows that if 󳇛©φ󳇠 is true in a world, so
is 󳇛©(φ ∧ ⊤)󳇠, even if 󳇛©⊤󳇠 is not. (See Goble (1990, 198, n. 8) for a similar
feature.) That is, in any world in which something is obligatory, any tautology
that isn’t obligatory will still be a conjunct of an obligatory conjunction. So
neighborhood semantics invalidates ©-NEC but doesn’t quite respect the mo-
tivating intuition for denying ©-NEC in the first place, especially if one thinks
that obligations or oughts should distribute over conjunction.4
Now, if we want our semantics to invalidate ©-NEC and thereby allow for
some non-obligatory tautologies, we will also need to invalidate either ©-RE
or the following:
&-Distribution. ©(φ ∧ ψ) ⊃ (©φ ∧ ©ψ)
Neighborhood semantics invalidates &-Distribution rather than ©-RE. But I
believe this is less intuitive than doing the converse on some readings of the
©-operator. On these readings, if a conjunction is obligatory, so are its con-
juncts. Although ©-RE is widely regarded as “the most fundamental and least
controversial rule of inference in deontic logic,”(McNamara 2006, 205), I be-
lieve that ©-RE is deeply unintuitive. I’m also not alone: Hansson (2006,
322) says that it “gives rise to most of the major deontic paradoxes.” (Com-
pare Schroeder (2011, 19-21).) For it turns out that, as long as &-Distribution
holds, and as long as ©-RE is valid, in any model in which anything is oblig-
atory, every tautology is obligatory. So if we find &-Distribution intuitive, we
must invalidate both ©-NEC and ©-RE. As far as I’m aware, no deontic se-
mantics plausibly does this because the theories on o󰎎er overwhelmingly rely
on maximally consistent entities like possible worlds to treat ©-statements.
Given the background metaphysics in Warmke (2015; 2019) according to
which properties obey the general sum principle, we can define a Leibnizian
intension with nearly whatever parts we like. So we can invalidate ©-NEC and
©-RE in a new way. As we saw in Section 5, O (the property of being an ideal
world) intuitively includes, in every SDL model, the propositional properties
corresponding to all the tautologies. But, now, instead of using O to account
for ©-statements, we might opt for the “smaller” O−. In many models, O− is a
property which lacks many but not all of the tautologous parts which belong
to O in every SDL model.
Let O− satisfy (O-K) and (O-D) (from Section 5), as well as:
(a) [φ ∧ ψ] is part of O− i󰎎 [φ] and [ψ] are parts of O−
(b) if [φ] is part of O−, [φ ∨ ψ] is part of O−
(c) [φ] is part of O− i󰎎 [¬¬φ] is part of O−
And let O− also satisfy cross-connective equivalencies, such as:
4 Pigden (1989, 140) has similar critiques of the systems in Schotch and Jennings (1981)
and Chellas (1980, 272-276).
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(d) [φ ∧ ψ] is part of O− i󰎎 [¬(¬φ ∨ ¬ψ)] is part of O−
(e) [φ ⊃ ψ] is part of O− i󰎎 [¬φ ∨ ψ] is part of O−
Given that O− now replaces O, it is trivial to show that the resulting semantics
invalidates ©-NEC and ©-RE but validates ©-K via (O-K), ©-D via (O-D),
and principles like &-Distribution via (a) and the ∨-Weakening principle, ©φ
⊃ ©(φ ∨ ψ), via (b). Although ∨-Weakening inspires Ross’s paradox, I follow
Wedgewood (2007, 115) and believe that pragmatic considerations dissolve it.
The semantics has three more features worth highlighting. First, O− ar-
guably involves a more complicated set-up than O. Absent the constraints that
would validate both ©-NEC and ©-RE, we need extra principles to ensure
that we can draw inferences about what’s obligatory from what’s obligatory
without guaranteeing that all tautologies are obligatory, too. We seem to have
sacrificed some elegance, as a result.
Second, given the above constraints, O− need not have any parts at all. In
models in which O− has no parts, nothing is obligatory and, in my view, ‘O−’
refers to no property at all in the metalanguage. But we should expect models
without obligations in a semantics that invalidates both ©-NEC and ©-RE. In
fact, some suggest that the main purpose for including ©-NEC is to guarantee
that something or other is obligatory in every model. For example, Chellas
(1974, 23) even claims that “the presence of [©-NEC] is equivalent to the thesis
that obligations exist at every possible world.” However, I would have thought
that if there were obligations necessarily in force, they would resemble ‘it is
obligatory that no one murders’ more than ‘it is obligatory that 1 is even or 1
isn’t even’. So if we want to preclude obligation-less models without recourse to
tautologies, we may introduce δ1, ..., δn as non-logical, propositional constants,
restrict O− to have [δ1], ..., [δn] as parts in every model, and, where 1 ≤ m ≤ n,
add each ©δm to the logic as an axiom.
Third, although the semantics doesn’t require tautologies to be obligatory,
it still allows for obligatory tautologies. For example, if 󳇛©φ󳇠 is true, because
[φ] is part of O−, then, by (b), [φ ∨ ¬φ] is also part of O−, which makes 󳇛©φ ∨
¬φ󳇠 true. This result seems plausible to me.
As far as I know, no other semantics for deontic modal logic invalidates ©-
NEC and ©-RE and validates both &-Distribution and ∨-Weakening. Hence,
the original modal semantics described in Section 3 not only provides the raw
materials for the new deontic semantics in Sections 4 through 7. It also pro-
vides opportunities to approach problems in deontic logic from a new angle.
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